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Abstract:  Assuming that all animals are sentient would mean ending their use in most scientific 
research. This does not necessarily imply an unscientific or anti-scientific stance. Examining the 
social role of science reveals its considerable investment in preserving the status quo, including 
the continued use of animal subjects. From this perspective, the use of animal subjects is a custom 
that science could move beyond, rather than a methodological requirement that it must defend.  
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Jonathan Birch (2017) has taken up the task of clarifying the evidence of sentience required to 
provide an animal basic protection from harm. This is a valuable task. I found his paper carefully 
reasoned and thought-provoking. I am honored to join the list of scholars in conversation about 
his work.  
 One way around the need to set an evidential bar would be to assume that all animals are 
sentient, unless proven otherwise. Birch presents this option in section 2 of his target article. 
Arthur Reber (2016) has already supported this in his commentary, using his Cellular Basis of 
Consciousness model (2016). Birch deems this option “extreme” because “it would invite the 
charge of being unscientific or anti-scientific.” It would make research on animal sentience 
unnecessary and irrelevant. Moreover, because it would rule out the use of even fruit flies and 
nematodes, common models in bioscience, it would create “significant practical obstacles to 
biomedical research.” I’m reminded of the scene in the original “Ghostbusters,” where Bill Murray 
famously said, “Back off, man. I’m a scientist.” 
 From this, I conclude that the freedom to harm animals must be preserved so that 
scientists can find out how much harm animals can take. Moreover, we need to continue harming 
even the smallest of animals in the interest of “science.”  
 I am neither a biologist nor a philosopher. Rather, I am a sociologist, trained to question 
the social role of science, the nature of expertise, and the conditions under which knowledge is 
produced. Science’s main interest is self-preservation and protecting itself against threats to 
authority. Concerns about being “anti-scientific” make sense only in contrast to a view of science 
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as objective and rational, and of scientists as neutral and autonomous. In light of the vast science 
studies literature, I very much doubt that Birch believes this propaganda, but his model depends 
on an acceptance of Kuhnian “normal scientific standards.”  
 Against the view of objectivity and neutrality, science’s ties to commercial interests have 
made truly independent research very nearly impossible. In academia and government, the 
autonomy scientists traditionally enjoyed “has been steadily eroded by the short-term, profit-
driven interests of corporations” (Marshall & Picou 2008, p. 244). Because profits require an 
unending stream of “needs,” any objections to the use of animals must compete with tales of 
human suffering, for which more research — on animals — is necessary. In the service of 
corporate imperatives, anything that can be done to animals will be done to them.  
 Research indicates that animal researchers seek to preserve the ability to conduct 
research on animals. For example, a 2012 analysis of animal research ethics committees (IACUCs) 
at the 25 top American institutions receiving funding from the National Institutes of Health found 
the committees populated mostly by animal researchers, laboratory veterinarians, and others 
with a vested interest in continuing animal experiments (Hansen, Goodman, & Chandna 2012). 
The imbalance both contributes to “previously-documented committee biases in favor of 
approving animal experiments” and weakens “input from the few members representing animal 
welfare and the interests of the general public.” Science protects its own.  
 The “normal scientific standards” and statistical significance that Birch recommends did 
not reassure me at all. Phrenology, bloodletting, mercury therapy: the list of harmful claims and 
grotesque procedures that once met “normal scientific standards” knows no end. Where pain is 
concerned, these standards justified performing open-heart surgery on newborn human infants 
without anesthesia until the 1980s (Segner 2016). After all, there was no reliable evidence that 
babies could feel pain, and even if they did, they would not remember it. Moreover, while 
statistically significant evidence of the presence of an indicator of sentience sounds like an 
acceptable standard, the academic and popular literatures have documented the pitfalls of 
significance testing. The common practice known as p-hacking, where a researcher obtains 
significance by omitting data or running endless tests, has created what some call a crisis of 
reproducibility, that bedrock of scientific method (Head et al. 2015).  
 I support the spirit of Birch’s approach, but I want to think beyond what science “needs.” 
Rather, I want science to think beyond what it customarily needs, which is an endless supply of 
other animals. Let’s make the third of the 3Rs mean replace animals, not just replace them with 
“lower” animals. If this comes across as anti-science, I’ll clarify that there is a difference between 
hostility to science and questioning science’s social role. It is possible to appreciate the value of 
science while keeping a critical eye on its conduct and values.  
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